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Concepts: where subjectivism goes wrong
Abstract
The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats
them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist
independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's
RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different
individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a
‘non-negotiable constraint'. At the same time they insist that by distinguishing between sign-types and -
tokens the Fregean objection cannot just be circumvented but revealed to be fallacious. My paper
rehabilitates the Fregean argument against subjectivism. The RTM response rests either on an
equivocation of ‘concept'—between types which satisfy the non-negotiable constraint and tokens which
are mental particulars in line with RTM doctrine—or on the untenable idea that one and the same entity
can be both a shareable type and hence abstract and a concrete particular in the head. Furthermore,
subjectivism cannot be rescued by adopting unorthodox metaphysical theories about the type/token and
universal/particular contrasts. The final section argues that concepts are not representations or signs, but
something represented by signs. Even if RTM is right to explain conceptual thinking by reference to the





they   exist   independently   of   individual  minds.   The  most   prominent   contemporary   version   of 
subjectivism is Fodor’s RTM. The Fregean charge against this kind of position is that it cannot do 
justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have 









Even if  RTM is right  to explain  conceptual  thinking  by reference to the occurrence of mental 
representations, concepts themselves cannot be identical with these representations.
Concepts have occupied a central role in philosophy ever since the Socratic quest 








In   spite   of   this   diversity,   one   can   detect   a   pervasive   contrast   between   two 





to  subjectivist  or  psychological  conceptions,   concepts   are  mental   phenomena, 
entities or goings­on in the mind or in the head of individuals.
The   most   prominent   contemporary   version   of   subjectivism   is   the 
representational theory of mind or ‘RTM’ championed by Fodor and his followers. 
Its   central   claim   is   that   concepts   are  mental   particulars.   Fodor   portrays   his 
enemies as part of a wide­ranging conspiracy, which includes Ryle, Wittgenstein, 
neo­Fregeans, conceptual or inferential role semanticists,  and holists of various 
sorts.   He   labels   this   conspiracy   ‘pragmatism’,   because   it   links   concepts   to 








stage   in   recent   debates,   but   concepts   themselves:  Can  RTM,   as   a   version  of 
subjectivism, account for the shareability of concepts?
For RTM, ‘the mind is pre­eminently the locus of mental representation 
and   mental   causation’   .4  It   is   a   ‘representational   system’,   and   thinking   is 
‘representing things in the world’ .5  So­called propositional attitudes like belief 
and  desire   are  mental   states,   and   they   ‘are   constituted  by   relations   to  mental 














which   they  occur  are   true   (in   the case  of  beliefs)  or   satisfied  (in   the case of 
desires).
At   present   it   is   often   assumed   that   the   conflict   between   Fregean 
objectivists  and representationalists  simply rests on two diverse conceptions of 
concepts, serving different yet compatible interests. On the one hand, logicians, 
formal   semanticists   and   conceptual   analysts   require   a   notion  of   concepts   that 
makes them independent of individual people (whether it be as Fregean modes of 
presentation,   sets  of   real  or  possible  objects,   functions  on  such  entities,  or  as 
abstractions   from   intersubjective   linguistic   practices).   On   the   other   hand, 
psychologists,  philosophers of mind and members of the artificial intelligentsia 







cannot   be   mental   particulars   since   they   can   be  shared  between   different 








In   the   second   section   I   show   that   this   response   misconstrues   the   Fregean 
argument, and that it ultimately rests either on an equivocation or on the untenable 
idea  that  one and  the same entity can be  both  a  shareable  type and hence an 
abstract universal  and  a concrete  mental particular.  This absolves Frege of  the 
charge of having committed a gross fallacy. But section 3 considers the further 











Frege  uses   the   term  ‘idea’   [Vorstellung]   to   signify  what  RTM calls   a  mental 
particular.   Frege’s   ideas   include   sensations,   but   they   also   include   mental 
representations. Such an idea is capable of representing objects that are objective; 
yet the idea itself is subjective, i.e. ‘something that belongs to the mental life of an 




One should never forget  that  the ideas of different people,  however 
similar they may be—something which cannot, incidentally, be exactly 
determined—do not coincide but are to be distinguished. Each has his 




Everything  is  eventually dragged  into  the realm of psychology;  the 
boundary between the objective and the subjective disappears more 
and   more,   and   even   actual   [wirkliche]   objects   are   treated 
psychologically as ideas .12
For Frege13   a concept is the ‘referent’ (Bedeutung) rather than the ‘sense’ of a 
‘concept­word’   or   predicate;   and   it   is   ‘senses’   rather   than   concepts   that   are 

























the   current   context,   however,   this   inaccuracy   does   not  matter.   Frege   himself 
occasionally used ‘concept’ for the sense of concept­words .17 Contemporary neo­






more   finely   than   Fregean   referents   (extensions)   but   also   than   properties   or 
intensions, and just as finely as Fregean senses (which are shared by predicates 






Shareability18  is  a  feature of   the ordinary concept  of a  concept   in both 
everyday  life  and  in  disciplines  like psychology and  the history of  ideas.  One 
central use we make of ‘concept’ and terms that are equivalent in the relevant 





















‘language   of   thought   hypothesis’   treats  mental   representations   as   symbols   and 
consequently invites the semiotic distinction that Peirce himself introduced. Fodor 
maintains   that  both   the meaning of  public   languages  and  the   intentionality  of 
thought  can be explained by a   ‘language of   thought’.22  External  sentences  are 
meaningful   because   they   are   correlated   with  internal  signs,   sentence­like 
representations   in   the   brain   the   tokening   of   which   constitutes   our   thinking 
(believing,   desiring,   etc.).   The   ultimate   carriers   of   intentional   content   are 
sentences   in   ‘Mentalese’,   physical   tokens   of   computational   types.  When   we 






both   cases,   the   tokens   are   concrete   particulars   and   the   types   are 
abstracta. Likewise, the mental particular that’s in your head when you 














neural   token­sentence,   and   in   Sarah’s   brain   there   occurs   another  neural   token­
sentence. Yet Anne and Sarah both believe the same thing, namely that dogs bark, 




This  position can account  for shareability.  It  does so at  a  price,  however.  The 
type/token   distinction   cannot   be  used   to   invalidate   Frege’s   argument,   since   it 
implies abandoning the claim that concepts themselves are particulars. After all, 
what  can be shared between different   individuals  are   representation­types;  and 
these   types,   as   Fodor   duly   acknowledges,   are   ‘abstracta’   rather   than  mental 















At   issue   between  RTM  and   objectivism   is  not  whether   concepts   allow   of   a 
type/token distinction .26   It is whether concepts, the things which can be shared 
between different subjects, could be mental particulars, that is, tokens rather than 
types.    As far  as   the  Fregean objection  is  concerned,  proponents  of  RTM are 
perfectly  entitled  to  postulate  a   language of   thought   involving  the  tokening of 
sign­types. Still, if they persistently kept apart types and tokens, they would be 
forced to abandon the central claim of RTM, namely that concepts are mental 
particulars   that   can   enter   into   causal   relations.   Instead   they   would   have   to 

















be  had  Frege  argued   that   two  people   can’t   literally  utter   the  same 
sentence. While it’s true that each will produce her own token, that 
doesn’t   mean   that   the   utterances   can’t   be   instances   of   the   same 
sentence type …. (.28
Margolis and Laurence accuse Frege of a ‘type–token confusion’.29 This label is 
misleading,   since   Frege   did   not   consider   concepts   in   terms   of   a   type/token 
distinction for mental representations, distinguishing instead between mental ideas 




A   token   in  A’s   head  must   be  numerically  distinct  from a   token   in  B’s  head. 






than   (concrete)   particulars   in   the   heads   of   individuals,   which   is   just   what 
objectivists have been claiming. Frege is not guilty of confusing type and token. 
Rather,  Laurence  and Margolis   run   together  a  claim  that  holds   for   the  tokens 
postulated by RTM, namely that they are mental particulars, with a claim that 
holds for the types to which these tokens belong, namely that they are shareable.













abstracta.   This   concession  willy­nilly   carries   over   to   concepts,   since   for   him 
people ‘have literally the same concept’ in that they have ‘tokens of literally the 


















rebuttal   suffers   from  precisely   the  kind  of   vacillation  Frege  diagnosed   in   his 
psychologistic  opponents.  The qua­operator   that  Fodor   relies on  is  notoriously 
slippery.33  On one understanding it  means  in  the capacity of,  and ascribes  two 






























and   the   same   design.   This   response  would   be   adequate   if   the   aim  were   to 
accommodate  Frege’s   point   by  distinguishing  between   shareable   concepts   and 
their   physical   tokens.   In   fact,   however,   inveterate   subjectivists   reject   Frege’s 












existence of  tokens  that  share a certain  role or   function (mutatis  mutandis  for 
universals and particulars).
The  insistence   that  concepts  are  both  shareable  and particular   faces  an 





Or  it   conjures  up   a   chimerical   amalgamation,   some  we­know­not­what  which 















the   concession   that   the   physical   tokens   of   the   language   of   thought   are   not 
shareable. At first sight this may seem attractive. The tokens of a public language 
can  be   shared,   at   least   if   they   are   inscriptions.   For   instance,   two   different 
demonstrators can hold up a single placard together.
The trouble is that this possibility does not extend to the tokens postulated 
by  RTM,  which   are   supposed   to   be   phenomena   in   the  mind   or   brain   of   an 
individual. What can be shared between different subjects of thought is not such a 
token but  only  a   type—no matter  whether  a   type   is   identified   in   typographic 
terms,   as   in   public   languages,   or   in   the   computational­syntactic   terms   that 





















by two different  individuals.  This would suffice  to show that concepts are not 
mental particulars, even if one could fashion a different notion of sharing which 





inveterate subjectivist simply means that they have  different  tokens of the  same 
type. Once more, what is the same between them concerns an abstract universal 
rather   than   a  mental  particular;   therefore   only   the   former,  not   the   latter,   is   a 
candidate for being the concept which, ex hypothesis, they both possess. Consider 








Neither   equivocation,   nor   the   idea   of   a   type/token  mongrel,   nor   the 





precedent  might   be   provided   by  Armstrong’s     suggestion   that   universals   are 
‘wholly present’   in each particular   that   instantiates  them and hence  located in 
space   and   time.35  If   we   apply   this   idea   to   our   present   topic,   the   following 
suggestion emerges: Rather than sharing a token, Anne and Sarah share a type 
which is nonetheless wholly located in their respective minds or brains.
There  are   strong arguments  against   the   idea   that  a  universal  U  can  be 
wholly present in two distinct and spatio­temporally separate particulars x1 and x2. 
In that case U would have to be located where x1  is and  located where x2  is. But 
since having the same spatio­temporal location is a transitive relation, this implies 
that  x1  and  x2  have   the   same   spatio­temporal   location   .36  Furthermore,   if   the 
universal  of  being red were wholly present   in a  particular  tomato,   it  could be 
destroyed by painting that tomato green. Unlike the previous consequence, this is 
not a contradiction; yet it is still absurd.37
Both   of   these   unpalatable   consequences   carry   over   directly   to   the 






















namely   that   concepts   be   shareable.   As   we   have   seen,   even   the   appeal   to 





have ‘tokens of literally  the same concept’.  This gives  the game away, since it 
explicitly contrasts the concept itself with the particulars that are its tokens.
One  might   hold   instead   that  Anne   and   Sarah   can   entertain   the   same 
thought  not  because   they  share  a   single  concept  DOG (which could not  be  a 
19
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particular),   but   because   they  merely   have   distinct   (particular)   concepts  which 
stand in a certain similarity relation, e.g. in that they play similar roles in their 
respective   mental   lives.   Here   one   might   take   a   leaf   out   of   the   book   of 














Even   if  Fodor   owned  up   to   the   consequence   that   shareable   concepts   are   not 
particulars, his position would still suffer from incoherence.
Very   roughly,  concepts  are  constituents  of  mental   states.  Thus,   for 
example,   believing   that  cats  are  animals  is   a   paradigmatic  mental 
state, and the concept ANIMAL is a constituent of the belief that cats  
are  animals… mental   states   and  processes   are   typically   species  of 
20
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one  hand,  concepts are  supposed  to  be constituents/parts  of  mental  states  and 
processes, which in turn are declared to be relations to mental representations. On 
the   other   hand,   concepts   are   supposed   to   be   constituents/parts   of   the  mental 
representations themselves.
It is doubtful that there is any case of a thing being both part of a relation 

























According   to   Fodor,  Anne   and   Sarah   do   not   stand   directly   in   a   relation   of 
believing to  the proposition that  dogs bark.  Rather,   they stand in a relation to 
tokens of the thought or Mentalese type­sentence DOGS BARK; and that thought 
expresses  the proposition, it ‘means that’  Dogs bark   .43 By the same lights, the 
concept DOG is a Mentalese type­word which has the property being human as its 
meaning.




















between   propositional   attitudes.   Such   explanations   require   ‘covering 































they  deny  that  different   types  of  mental   representations  can  express   the  same 
concept, since they ‘will have substantially different inferential roles’. Secondly, 
even if different types of internal representations could express the same concept 














there   is  no  symbol  or   representation  type  of  which both  ‘city’  and  ‘ville’  are 
tokens. Of course, they have something in common. Yet it has nothing to do with 
either   the   typographic   level   at   which   type­words   in   public   languages   are 













not   have   to   be   shared   by   people   entertaining   the   same   thought.   Fodor’s 
representation types are individuated not typographically, but through their syntax, 






















sameness  of  concepts  are,   trivially,   those  which  are  constitutive  of  conceptual 
content.   This   not   only   contradicts   Fodor’s   adamant   rejection   of  any  kind   of 












A  version  of  RTM which   takes   these   lessons  on  board  will   still   be   a 
representationalist  model of the mind in general and of conceptual  thinking in 
particular. Yet it will no longer constitute a genuinely subjectivist position about 
concepts.  RTM’s case against  objectivism has evaporated,  and  its  case  against 
concept   pragmatism   has   to   be   re­jigged   as   follows:   we   entertain   conceptual 
thoughts   not   by   exercising   an   ability,   but   through   the   occurrence   of   neural 
tokenings of symbolic types; and we share a conceptual thought if those types 
have the same meaning or content. This case ought to be resisted, in my view. In 





























9  On   this   point   I   agree   with   Sutton   (‘Are   Concepts   Mental   Representations   or   Abstracta?’,  Philosophy   and 
Phenomenological Research 68 (2004), 89­93) and Margolis/Laurence (op. cit. note 1, 589 n.10). But whereas they opt 
for subjectivism (alias RTM or mentalism), I defend Frege’s objectivist argument concerning shareability. Unlike Fodor, 










































than  tokens,  and hence cannot be mental  particulars.  However,  while  all  parties  to   the debate  rightly assume that 
concepts can be shared, it is more controversial to maintain that concepts can exist even if they are never employed by a 
subject  of  conceptual   thought.  For  what  it   is  worth,   I   reject   this claim while accepting an analogous claim about 
properties.





























































W.  Künne,  Conceptions  of  Truth  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,   2003),   368­72).   Furthermore,   far   from being 
identical with sentence­meanings, what is said on a particular occasion depends on sentence­meaning and context of 
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